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Abstract: The aim of this article is to argue for an interdisciplinary social 
theoretical approach to the technicity of human agency. This approach covers the 
spectrum of individual and social action from a perspective that logically precedes 
techno-optimism and techno-pessimism, and is intended to be both descriptively 
and normatively plausible. The study is anchored in a critical reading of Aristotle’s 
thought on techné and phronésis, as his work is the precursor of action theory and 
phenomenological hermeneutics, the central methodological orientations of this 
study. The importance of the “disposition formed under the guidance of reason” 
as the unifying trait of agency is affirmed with, and against, Aristotle. The article 
advocates reactivating and developing this trait of agency for a descriptive and 
critical discourse on the technicity of action, providing an outline of how to ac-
complish this task. The technicity of the individual agent is examined, reflecting 
on rule-following, the relation between technicity and creativity, and the inter-
pretative moment of technicity. Next, the interwovenness of the skilful body with 
biological, social and symbolic aspects of human existence and with systems of 
technical artefacts is clarified. Finally, a case is made for the critical potential of 
this “technology,” reverting to Aristotelian means of normative thought.
I. “TECHNOLOGY” AS A DISCOURSE ON THE  
TECHNICITY OF HUMAN AGENCY
One of the most difficult aspects of philosophising about technics or technology is 
gaining a proper understanding of the technicity of human beings involved in tech-
nics or technology. This enterprise is made all the more difficult by the paradox that 
the technicity of the human agent goes far beyond the domain of his/her capacity as 
homo faber (the capacity of a human being in strictly technical processes), while the 
far-reaching technicity of the human agent by no means exhausts the nature of the 
human being.
As one considers widely held views and scientific literature on human beings and 
technology,1 one becomes aware of several recurring obstacles that need to be overcome 
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to develop a useful and acceptable account of the human being as technical agent. 
In particular, three obstacles, which are often interrelated, need to be addressed:
Ideologically biased approaches—There is a tendency to argue from a pre-
conceived pessimism or optimism regarding technical processes in general, 
even among philosophers and other theoreticians of technics. This compromises 
an accurate and comprehensive account of technical agency, because it results 
in certain aspects of the existence of the agent, or certain qualities of the life of 
the technical agent, being privileged or emphasised at the expense of others, 
distorting the description of technical agency.
Fallacy of the instrumental degradation of the agent—Thought on human 
agents as technical agents is often dominated by the fear that considering 
human technicity may lead to an instrumentalising degradation of human ex-
istence, in other words, that it might ultimately reduce people to mere “cogs 
in a machine.” This concern may be justified in some practical contexts, but 
it would be fallacious to reduce the nature of human technicity to its more 
pathological manifestations. Moreover, this fallacy typically leads to a neglect 
of the technical aspects of human agency.
Exaggeration of the distinction between anthropological aspects—This third 
obstacle is closely related to the second. It refers to a recurrent insistence on 
a strong distinction, if not an opposition, between the human agent as a tech-
nical agent on the one hand, and as an agent of ethics, aesthetic production 
or politics on the other. This strong distinction is charged with preserving the 
dignity of other aspects of human existence that are considered more humane 
or essential to being human than technicity. Thus, technical agency is implicitly 
or explicitly denigrated from the outset, or relegated to a specific role that is 
to be adopted, ignored or rejected at will by the true human agent.
In this programmatic article, I propose a combined hermeneutic and action 
theoretical approach to the human being as a technical agent in response to these 
three theoretical difficulties in order to lay the groundwork for an integrated theory 
of the technicity of human agency and action. I use the term “integrated” in a dual 
sense: first, this study aims to respect and explore the mutual integration of technical 
and non-technical aspects of human agency; second, my ambition is to demonstrate 
how such a theory of human technicity can integrate descriptive and normative 
concerns. Perhaps the biggest challenge in this project is that it requires continu-
ous openness to issues that span several disciplines. Among these, philosophy of 
technology, social theory and action theory (philosophical, sociological and anthro-
pological) feature strongly in this article. I draw on a number of methodological 
allies: the history of philosophy, phenomenology and hermeneutics. The reward, 
if the risky business of undertaking such an encompassing project is successful, is 
a transversal view on the entire range of the technicity of human agency, and the 
above disciplines will in turn benefit from the results.2
I identify four essential, interrelated aspects of human existence in order to 
point out the specificity of the technical aspect of human existence, without losing 
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sight of the ways in which this aspect is integrated into the larger range of anthro-
pological traits. These four aspects—identified for heuristic purposes—are the 
biological, the social, the symbolic and the technical. These aspects are subject to 
different degrees of change and variation, and, taken together, are constitutive of 
the overall historical condition of being human. This historical condition calls for 
continuous interpretation. If one accepts the trajectory of modern Western herme-
neutics—from Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics as the interpretation of all texts, 
to Dilthey’s hermeneutics as the methodology of understanding in all the human 
sciences, and then to Heidegger’s widening of hermeneutics to the very fibre of the 
existence of human beings,3 in other words, to considering interpretation as the mode 
of existence of human beings—then it could be claimed that the different aspects 
of human existence are each a matter of understanding or interpretation, albeit in 
different ways. Whereas the hermeneutic constitution of the symbolic and social 
aspects of human existence has been subjected to extensive philosophical and social 
scientific enquiry (for instance by philosophers such as Gadamer and Ricœur, and 
social scientists such as Garfinkel, Goffman, and Bourdieu), less work has been 
done on the hermeneutic constitution of the technical aspect of human existence.4 
This neglect is to the detriment of our understanding both of socio-technical sys-
tems and of the human being. Proposing a rehabilitation of the technical aspect of 
human existence in the framework of a complete hermeneutic anthropology calls 
for a methodological strategy in which our attention is temporarily drawn away 
from the characteristics of technical artefacts, systems and procedures where human 
beings are taken up as agents, in order to first examine carefully the human being, 
whose technicity is deployed as much in technical contexts as in what is commonly 
considered to be non-technical contexts.
On the basis of the above considerations, by which I have turned our 
attention to the human being and his/her technicity, I invite the reader to regard 
the term ‘technology’ as we regard the names of other social sciences, such as 
‘criminology’ or ‘sociology’ or ‘anthropology.’ Accordingly, ‘technology’ refers 
to intelligent discourse on technics or human technicity, in other words, on the 
human ability to embark on skilful action and the application of this ability in 
coordination with artefacts.5 It is not my aim to call into existence a new discipline. 
My intention with the somewhat provocative title of my article is polemical: I 
focus attention as much on the still widespread neglect of technics in the human 
and social sciences6 as on the reduction to the mechanical (often assumed in other 
academic disciplines) of technics as an aspect of human existence. To formulate 
positively what I put forward for consideration, “technology,” understood in the 
way proposed here, is practised as an elaboration of a social theory, as a theory 
of social action, social order and social change (cf. Joas and Knöbl 2004, 37). By 
exploring technology in this way, and stressing for current purposes social action, 
one could demonstrate the plausibility of the underlying hypothesis of everything 
that follows, namely that neglect or distortion of human technicity is an offence 
against human nature as a result of which one may well expect offences against 
human beings themselves. The last section of the article outlines the critical im-
port of this hypothesis. Critique is used here in a very broad sense. Accordingly, 
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“technology” could be considered a critical social theory in that it contributes to 
our efforts to expose or to “diagnose” faults in the social conditions that obstruct 
people’s self-realisation.7
It has to be recognised that there is a long and honourable tradition of study and 
reflection on technics in most human and social sciences. Archaeology, anthropol-
ogy, history and cultural studies are barely conceivable without scholars who are 
devoted to this aspect of their discipline. However, technics seldom takes center 
stage in the social sciences (let alone the humanities) in a manner comparable to 
what has been the case for, say, reason, language, or politics. Very often “technol-
ogy” is treated (or neglected) as a minor subdivision of disciplines of the human 
and social sciences. In order to demarcate the space for a full-fledged discourse 
regarding human technicity, a strategic methodological stance has to be adopted: 
instead of thinking of technics as a particular kind of object of study, it should 
primarily be conceived as a distinct perspective on the entire human reality. This 
suggestion has already been made by a few other authors, notably by André-Georges 
Haudricourt in his book La technologie science humaine (Technology as a human 
science), which provided the inspiration for the title of the current article8 (cf. also 
Haudricourt 1987, 37).
The most fundamental presupposition of this approach to the technical human 
agent is of phenomenological origin. It is also one of the most fundamental con-
victions shared by philosophical hermeneuticists, namely that all forms of human 
existence can be considered (unless proven otherwise) to be forms of openness 
to the world and, as such, legitimate grounds for knowledge (see Husserl [1913] 
1993, §24). Accordingly, all forms of interaction with the world, including the 
technical constitution and mediation of action, should be relevant to the acquisition 
of knowledge, in this case, for a study of human agency. This presupposition is 
appropriated in the current article along the lines of Ricœur’s hermeneutic trans-
formation of Husserl’s concept of plural intentional directedness to the world—in 
such a way that the what and the how of intentionality can reflexively identify and 
characterize the who (the human being as a capable agent).9 Conceived in this man-
ner, “technology” is, in the first place, the study of the technicity of human action. 
Here, “technicity” refers—as I demonstrate in this article—to the skilful human 
body, whose abilities are deployed in striving towards forms of excellence and/or 
in the corresponding use of means.
The development of such a hermeneutic of the technicity of human action 
aspires to do justice to this anthropological aspect to overcome the three recurrent 
obstacles to this endeavour (discussed above). Accordingly, the current study has 
four objectives.
The first objective is to establish a nuanced description of the technical con-
dition of the human agent. A legitimate assessment of the general tendencies of 
technical developments can only be made from a perspective that logically precedes 
techno-optimism and techno-pessimism, or more sophisticated convictions concern-
ing the general tendency of macro-technical developments. A plausible account of 
technical agency would be an essential component of such a perspective. It would 
preclude neither negative nor positive assessments of the general tendency of 
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technical developments. In fact, the phenomenological approach aims at preparing 
a more justified, but therefore also a more nuanced, assessment. However, such 
assessments follow only as a second step.
The second objective is to establish the essential technical nature of human 
existence. Careful inspection will show how the technical agent is almost perma-
nently engaged to varying degrees with the multiple facets of the technical system, 
and that technical systems depend on technical agency. Without such an account, the 
workings of technical systems are distorted, and typical ways of human existence 
are misrepresented beyond recognition.
The third objective is to establish the close interconnection of technicity with 
other aspects of human existence. If the full extent of human technicity is grasped, 
a strong distinction or even opposition between different spheres of human agency 
becomes untenable. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the biological, social and 
symbolic aspects of human agency are intimately related to human technicity. 
In fact, human beings are biological, symbolic and social beings in a technical 
manner. The current study validates the stated hypothesis (that neglect or distor-
tion of human technicity is an offence against human nature from which one may 
well expect offences against human beings themselves) and thus contributes to 
overcoming the three obstacles referred to above. A fourth objective is directly 
derived from this.
The fourth objective is to demarcate the normative potential of a theory of 
human technicity. If “technology” is to be a critical discourse, it is important to 
demonstrate how normativity can be derived from the nature of technical agency, 
and how the technicity of action is related to ethical considerations, which, although 
they are not non-technical, can never be reduced to their technical dimension.
Having set the objectives of the study, the strategy for meeting them can now 
be delineated. First, (section II) the article is rooted in a critical discussion with 
Aristotle as the significant methodological and thematic ancestor of my enterprise. 
By means of a critical re-reading of Aristotle’s distinction between virtue (the do-
main of praxis) and skill (the domain of poiésis), I argue that, as human capacities, 
the ethico-political and the skilful share a number of significant qualities and that 
the fine distinction between them does not amount to an opposition, but should 
rather be thought of as coordinating two mutually complementary facets of action 
(section III). Subsequently, the way toward a contemporary actualisation of both 
the critique of Aristotle’s position and its perennial value is affirmed, in the form 
of a phenomenological and hermeneutic account of the technical agent. This ap-
proach firmly rejects typological approaches to action.
The remainder of the article consists of three moments, in which essential 
components of this project are outlined. First (section IV), a nuanced presentation is 
given of the technicity of the human agent, reflecting on rule-following, the relation 
between technicity and creativity, and the interpretative moment of technicity. Then 
(section V), the interwovenness of the skilful body with the biological, social, sym-
bolic aspects of human existence, as well as with the systems of technical artefacts, 
is clarified. In conclusion (section VI), I make the case for the critical potential of 
this “technology” by reverting to Aristotelian means of normative thought.
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II. POINT OF DEPARTURE: RETHINKING PHRONÉSIS  
AND TECHNÉ AGAINST AND WITH ARISTOTLE
II.A. JUSTIFICATION
At least two important reasons may be given for starting this inquiry into human 
technical agency with Aristotle. Both are closely related to the adopted phenome-
nologico-hermeneutic and action theoretical approach to agency.
The first reason is historico-methodological. Phenomenological hermeneutics 
has drawn a lot of inspiration from Aristotle. In fact, Heidegger’s phenomenologis-
ing re-reading of Aristotle’s praxis as Dasein10 is central to the enlarged vision of 
hermeneutics that Heidegger introduced to philosophy (see above). Hence, post-
Heideggerian hermeneutics always carries with it a stock of Aristotelian thought—in 
particular on practice or action—as potential to be activated.11 I have serious res-
ervations12 about the early Heidegger’s own accepting and widening of Aristotle’s 
distinction between praxis (depending on ethico-political wisdom, phronésis) 
and poiésis (depending on technical skill, techné) and Heidegger’s subsequent 
introduction of an implicit “ethics” of authentic human existence. Nevertheless, 
my study, as a hermeneutic action theoretical study, remains indebted to this initial 
re-reading of Aristotle by Heidegger. The importance of Aristotle’s thought for 
work in phenomenological hermeneutics makes it important to revisit Aristotle on 
my own terms, in order to make Aristotle’s thought fruitful for hermeneutics in a 
manner different from the way in which Heidegger uses Aristotle’s ideas.13
The second reason is thematic. Central to Aristotle’s exposition in the Nicoma-
chean Ethics is his strategy of arguing for the specific nature of character virtues by 
contrasting them with technical skill. This line of argumentation is one of the main 
sources in Western thought for the clear distinction between human technicity and 
other aspects of human existence, and often inspires either claims of the innocence 
of technical life, or a denigration of technical life. When Aristotle’s phronésis is 
used to clarify the nature of hermeneutics or interpretation, many authors do this in 
contradistinction to Artistotle’s techné, which is, in the same movement, associated 
with an inferior or innocent form of human existence.
It can then be argued that Aristotle is part both of the solution (in suggest-
ing, through Heidegger, what the nature of the hermeneutic existence is) and of 
the problem (in suggesting that the notions of praxis and phronésis that inspired 
hermeneutics should be clearly separated from the notions of poiésis and techné). I 
believe it is possible to keep the gains of a phenomenological reading of phronésis 
intact, while problematizing what I consider its exaggerated distinction from techné, 
as I show in the next section.
II.B. RECONSIDERING TECHNÉ
There is no need to question that Aristotle, in Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
makes a clear distinction between the two intellectual virtues charged with phe-
nomena that change, namely phronésis and techné.14 It seems to me impossible to 
collapse this distinction entirely. However, if one turns to the first three books of 
the Ethics, it quickly becomes clear that Aristotle deploys an invalid distinction 
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between the forms of excellence of human conduct that lead to happiness—the 
character virtues (aretai) practised under the guidance of phronésis—and the forms 
of excellence of skill (technai). The great pains that Aristotle takes in this section of 
the Nicomachean Ethics to distinguish character virtues from skills is not central to 
his main argument of establishing the practice of character virtues as the particular 
manner in which fulfilling human action takes shape. In fact, the need to distinguish 
between virtue and skill arises only as an unexpected and undesired consequence 
of his extensive use of the analogy (that is, an accepted similarity) between virtue 
and skill to explain the nature of virtues. How is one supposed to tell apart virtue 
and skill if it is true that virtue can be shown by analogy to skill:
1. to be a form of excellence in action;
2. that it aims at some good;
3. that one cannot expect a high degree of precision in theorizing about it;
4. that it is not a natural capability,
5. but is acquired through habituation (ethizein), in other words, that we 
acquire a virtue by practising it;
6. that it can be destroyed only by means of re-habituation;
7. that it is situated in the non-rational but reason-obeying part of the soul;
8. that it is “archived” in the soul as a disposition (hexis); and
9. that is has to do what it can with what is given in a particular context,
since virtue and skill are the same in all of these respects?
Aristotle’s main argument for this distinction comes from a passage (NE 
1105a17–b1815) in which he explains what he means when he claims that one 
acquires the capacity to act virtuously by doing virtuous actions. This would seem 
to be an erroneous claim, as one could establish by means of an analogy: someone 
who spells correctly is not becoming a grammarian, but already is a grammarian 
(grammar is explicitly categorised by Aristotle as a technical skill). However, Ar-
istotle argues that this is not correct, since one does not call anybody a grammarian 
for having spelt a word correctly once or by chance, but only if that person spells 
words correctly in the manner that grammarians do, in other words, because of 
having acquired the grammarian’s skill. Analogously, one calls someone virtuous 
not because the person has once, or by chance, done something in a virtuous man-
ner, or for merely having done something that a virtuous person would do—but if 
that person does so by acting as a virtuous person.
Having established this principle on the basis of an analogy between virtue 
and skill, Aristotle then approaches the question of the relation between the agent 
and the product from a different angle: his question is now not “what qualifies 
someone as virtuous/skilful?” (to which the answer is “the qualities of the agent 
count more than the qualities of what s/he brings forth”). Instead, he asks “where 
is the merit of virtuous/skilful action respectively situated?” It is on the basis of 
this adjustment to the question that Aristotle hopes to undo the strong impression 
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of similarity created by his deployment of analogy: whereas the merit of a good 
skilful or technical action is determined by the product of that action, Aristotle 
claims that in the case of virtuous actions, the merit lies outside of the actions, in 
the agent that brings them forth.
Before we look at the three criteria that would qualify the merit of an agent 
of virtuous action, let me say the following about this claim: one may well want 
to accept that the merit of a product of skill resides in the product, but even so, 
Aristotle’s initial point remains true for skill too: it is very difficult to imagine how 
an excellent product of technical skill would come about if it is not through the 
working of a skilful agent. Thus, even though it is not on the merit of the techni-
cian that the quality of a product is evaluated, it is impossible for a good product 
to be created by any means other than by good technical agency. The merit of 
the product of technical action then seems to lie equally in the product and in the 
technical agent. As for virtue, the merit resides in the agent, since, even though 
the virtuous agent may fail to act virtuously here and there, it takes nothing away 
from his/her being virtuous and acting in a meritorious manner even when he/she 
fails. However, virtue is worthy of its name only if it is capable of attaining the 
goal reasonably often (that is, being an areté stochastiké). This implies that it is not 
consistent with Aristotle’s argument to claim that someone could be virtuous even 
if he/she regularly fails to produce virtuous action. In other words, if there are not 
enough virtuous actions behind the name of the agent of virtue (virtuous “products” 
of action), then even his/her virtuous action does not qualify to be called “virtuous”; 
in the domain of virtue, merit resides in the agent, but this has to be an agent that 
reasonably consistently produces meritorious actions. In this way, the claim that 
the good for virtue resides in the agent is relativized again. To conclude with and 
against Aristotle: an action is virtuous not merely on the basis of a virtuous agent, 
but also not without virtuous actions; an action is skilful, not merely on the basis 
of skilful products, but also not without a skilful agent.
But let us return to Aristotle’s effort to distinguish the agent of virtue from 
the agent of skill (in the passage referred to above). According to Aristotle, it can 
be demonstrated that the agent of virtue can be seen as something quite different 
from the agency of skill by considering the following three defining traits of the 
virtuous agent:
1. this agent acts with knowledge of the action to be accomplished;
2. this agent acts by exercising a choice and the choice elects actions for 
themselves (in other words, these actions do not serve as means to attaining 
a goal, but could be considered the ultimate goal of human action); and
3. this agent acts from a firm and stable disposition.
These qualifications of the agent of virtue do not apply to the agent of skill, 
Aristotle claims, except for the need to act out of knowledge (trait n°1), and that is 
more important even in technical actions. This leaves two traits that distinguish virtue, 
but it is difficult to agree with Aristotle on these. He defines “choice” as “deliberative 
striving” (NE 1139a22–23, orexis bouleutiké). Striving (orexis) is the striving force 
of all forms of life towards goals. Deliberation (bouleusis) is generally applied to 
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all consideration of alternative actions. It is difficult to see why the agent of skill 
should not be said to be equally acting out of choice, as deliberative striving (trait 
n°2). As for acting out of a firm and stable disposition (hexis) (trait n°3), Aristotle 
has already argued that this is typical of the agent of virtue, by analogy with skill in 
the first place! All that remains of this partly spurious distinction is that the actions 
of virtue are chosen for themselves and not to serve some other good16—and that 
the accent in skill is on the product, and the accent in virtue is on the agent.
The close affinity between skill and virtue is clear when the arguments above 
are transferred to Aristotle’s definition of virtue:
Virtue, then, is a disposition of choice in matters of the mean [of emotions and 
actions] relative to us; this choice is made in accordance with reason and as the 
person gifted in practical reason would do it. It is a mean between two vices, 
one of excess, the other of deficiency. (NE 1106b36–1107a2, my translation)
What should strike us in this definition of virtue is that there is nothing in Ar-
istotle’s action theory that prevents us from compiling a parallel definition of skill. 
In fact, the closeness of skill to virtue (which Aristotle would have to concede if 
my arguments above are valid) may even be considered to invite such a definition. 
My neo-Aristotelian definition of skill would subsequently be this:
Skill, then, is a disposition of choice in matters of the mean relative to us, 
the choice is made in accordance with reason and is ideally executed as the 
person gifted in technical reason would do it. It is a mean between two flaws, 
one of excess, the other of deficiency, and where this mean can be described 
in terms of the discernible increments on the continuums of all the categories 
that determine the particular quality of an action (its agent, object, instru-
ment, manner, time, place, duration, reason, purpose17) between the two flaws.
I will refer to this definition again in the concluding section of the article (sec-
tion VI), in relation to the critical deployment of the term ‘technology.’
II.C. NO ACTION WITHOUT A DISPOSITION FORMED UNDER 
GUIDANCE OF REASON (HEXIS META LOGOU)
The close similarity established in the previous section between virtue and skill 
can obviously be examined further. However, for now it is more important to note 
that the overlap between these notions and the parallel definitions that capture their 
similarities allow us to claim that there is in fact only one disposition for making a 
choice (hexis prohairetiké) under the guidance of reason (meta logou—supported by 
NE 1140a3–5). The disposition for reasonable choice-making works in two similar 
but discernible ways, in the domain of praxis and of poiésis, both of which should 
be understood as deliberative striving (orexis bouleutiké). Consequently (without 
entering into the difficulties of Aristotle’s articulation of the relation between praxis 
and poiésis), I suggest, with Robert Bernasconi, that praxis governs poiésis. In other 
words, technical action is guided by virtuous action through a complex process of 
decision-making or choice, in the sense that virtue is concerned with technical life 
as part of the constituent intermediaries for its own realisation (Bernasconi 1986, 
ERNST WOLFF342
137–138). If this is plausible, then it makes sense to see praxis and poiésis not as 
two types of action, but as two distinguishable aspects of all action.
While this critical reading of Aristotle’s attempts to distinguish virtue and skill 
stands in clear tension with the Aristotelian tradition, the Nicomachean Ethics never-
theless enabled us to gain four important insights with regard to human agency.18
Firstly, the sharp distinction between ethico-political agency and technical 
agency should be softened considerably. In fact, these two manifestations of agency 
seem to be indissolubly interwoven.
Secondly, although human agency functions in a variety of ways, there is a 
significant overlap of the aspects of human capability at play in these different 
functions. This already suggests that we should adopt a non-typological approach 
to action.
Thirdly, the notion of disposition (hexis) is central to an understanding of the 
acquired capacities for action in human agents.
Fourthly, a number of important pointers outline the nature of disposition: if 
action is guided by practical wisdom or by skill, it seems in both cases to depend 
on a previously established disposition that (although it is not under the direct 
command of conscious reason and calculation) is formed under the influence of 
reason through habituation (disposition as hexis méta logou) and is activated by 
being exercised in a responsive way to each specific context.
It should also be noted that none of these thematic modifications with regard to 
Aristotle’s position poses any essential obstacles to the hermeneutic re-appropriation 
of the Greek philosopher initiated by Heidegger,19 and which I have appropriated 
as my methodology for this study. On the contrary, the regained insight into the 
close similarity between praxis (which inspires phenomenological hermeneutics) 
and poiésis (which often serves as the argumentational opposite of interpretation) 
opens the way for a new and fruitful hermeneutic re-appropriation and elaboration 
of these elements from Aristotle, with the help of the broad phenomenological and 
hermeneutic tradition.
I pursue the question of the nature of technical agency below by developing 
these gains from my rereading of Aristotle. The most appropriate way for a reac-
tualization of these findings takes as its point of departure the unity of wisdom and 
skill in the disposition formed under the guidance of reason.
III. TOWARDS A NON-TYPOLOGICAL APPROACH:  
THE SKILFUL BODY20
A contemporary exploration of the technical agent has to integrate the above gains 
into the context of current human and social scientific concerns. It should do so, 
avoiding the use of an action typology, as initiated by Aristotle, and developed in 
the long history of such typologies. It should also anchor the “technology” in an 
equally long tradition of exploration of the skilful body. As a point of departure for 
thinking with (and against) this tradition, I use Marcel Mauss’s notion of techniques 
du corps. Without digressing into that debate now, the discussion that follows will 
show that I find Mauss’s classical definition of the techniques du corps as “tra-
ditional and efficient acts” (actes traditionnels et efficaces—Mauss [1934] 1950, 
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371) at best insufficient. However, I do accept the essential point of this notion, 
namely that there is “something” in the incarnate human being—something that 
is described differently each time in the tradition, when it is designated as hexis, 
habitus or skill—that deserves to be characterised as “technical.” The preceding 
discussion in debate with Aristotle should suffice as a justification for accepting 
this technicity of the body. In the remainder of the article, I refer to this fact as 
bodily skills.21 This phenomenon, which I examine in more detail later, is the pri-
mary technical phenomenon. However, as I will demonstrate, it is not the origin 
of human technicity, and as constituted does not represent the basis or substrate 
of the being who acts.
As a first approximation, I use the term ‘bodily skills’ to refer to the series of 
abilities, dexterities or capabilities that are gradually acquired by the human body 
during its development. They have in common the fact that they are diverse ways 
of disciplining the natural tendencies with which the body comes into the world, 
namely tendencies (i) to release emotional tensions, (ii) to perform reflex move-
ments (to suckle, to seize, etc.) and, especially (iii) to fidget or wriggle22 (on their 
own, but also in interaction with others). I deliberately present these phenomena, 
well-known to those who rear children, in this manner, which explicitly avoids at-
tributing interests, expressive intent, or the pursuit of any end to these tendencies.23 
In other words, bodily skills refer to ways in which the spontaneous movements 
of the body are stretched out or projected, or strive toward a state other than that 
of the present.24 In this manner, bodily skills shape actions by guiding, restricting, 
specialising or refining the movements of the body, which then shows itself, most 
often (but not always), to be formed by discipline(s). Thus bodily skills are, together 
with the natural movements of the body,25 an aspect of the capability to act. In fact, 
they are a condition of the possibility to act, rather than a specific type of action.
Note from the outset that the language used to present bodily skills may 
mislead us about what these skills are. These bodily skills are often presented by 
citing very common examples: walking, swimming, singing, keeping one’s balance 
or, to cite less evident examples, paying attention, keeping one’s composure, etc. 
I obviously agree with this. However, in using a single verb, these examples are 
often already the product of a procedure of isolation or of generalization: either 
one isolates a component from a larger bundle of actions in which several actions 
and their corresponding bodily skills are interwoven (for example, “keeping our 
balance” may only be a part of cycling), or one generalizes this bundle of actions 
and their bodily skills by means of a general term (for example, “cycling” consists 
of coordinating several skills in action, including keeping our balance, steering, 
observing, navigating, exerting ourselves, and persevering).
As the capability of doing certain things, bodily skills are fairly stable dis-
positions to do things in certain ways when confronted with certain contexts (this 
“stability” has to be defined further—see section IV.A on “rule-following”). Thus, 
bodily skills are an essential component of the body’s familiarity with the world. 
Familiarity26 here refers to the non-consciousness-centred practical knowledge-
ability about the world.
A convincing presentation of bodily skills would have to expose their stabil-
ity (the fact that the agent can more or less count on them) and explain the ways 
ERNST WOLFF344
in which these skills, which often remain tacit, can nonetheless be brought to 
conscious attention and reflection and thus become available for us to improve on. 
Such an exposition would also have to disclose the ways in which the acquisition 
and exercise of bodily skills remain dependent on objects that are engaged in ac-
tion, on the biological conditions of the body, on the processes of individual and 
social apprenticeship, on interaction between people, and on the symbolic order. 
In full cognizance of the often standardising or automatizing effect that skills have 
on action, the task of elucidating the exercise of the bodily skills should enable 
us to give an account of how these bodily skills allow agents to embark on strings 
of action that may range between the extremes of routine and improvisation. The 
skilful body is thus central to our considerations, as justified at the beginning of 
this article, first, to articulate the interdependence of human technicity with other 
anthropological aspects, and second, to find the hinge that allows communication 
between the descriptive and normative, critical moments of “technology.” Laying 
the groundwork for all of these requirements is aim of the remainder of this study.
IV. FROM CAPABILITY TO ACTION:  
JUDGMENT, CREATIVITY, INTERPRETATION
Human beings’ capability to discipline their own bodies and the bodies of others to 
the point where their bodies can repeatedly execute specific actions at a high degree 
of efficiency has been known to humanity for a very long time.27 Some of the fears 
regarding the industrial exploitation of the disciplinability of bodies and the sub-
sequent inducement of machine-like, standardised, mindless action were captured 
comically, but eloquently, by Charlie Chaplin in Modern Times. I do not intend to 
make a plea for a return to a putative pre-industrial Eden of healthy, pleasurable 
uses of bodily skills. Nor do I suggest that we disregard the horrors of Fordist and 
Taylorist labor management, or the ideological celebration of the unity of people 
under tyrannical regimes as evoked in the military parades and other extravaganzas 
of mass gymnastics of which dictators are so fond. The thesis that underpins this 
article, and for which the expositions that follow argue, is that a proper study of 
bodily skills can demonstrate that pathological manifestations of standardisation 
of action—be it for industrial, military, political or other purposes—do not give 
us access to the full array of what the skilful body allows agents to do. In fact, our 
indignation regarding the exploitation of the efficiency of bodies for economic, 
military or similar ends is only intelligible against the background of a full picture 
of technical agency under non-oppressive conditions. The identification and cri-
tique of pathologies in the technical life of human beings depend on an accurate 
understanding of what the technicity of agents is and can be.
Earlier on in this study, I have argued for a non-typological approach to the 
technicity of human agency. A reading of Aristotle’s action theory—and consider-
able opposition to it—has highlighted the disposition formed under the influence of 
reason as an indispensable point of orientation in any study of human agency. The 
contemporary reactivation of the insights gained from the classical author places 
the skilful body in the center of concern in the study of agency and of technical 
agency in particular.
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Three interrelated traits of the passage from bodily skills as capabilities to the 
practical deployment of these capabilities in action need to be examined in order 
to get an understanding of how it is possible for bodily skills to be at the origin of 
standardized action as much as of innovative action—at the origin of practically all 
human action. First, the specifically human28 way of following rules in action has 
to be considered (section IV.A). This highlights the judgement associated with the 
deployment of bodily skills. Then, I argue that there is a relation of mutual implica-
tion between the technicity and the creativity of action (section IV.B). Finally, the 
gains of these two explorations allow us to thematize the hermeneutic working of 
action, notably in action through various means (section IV.C). By clarifying these 
three traits of the deployment of bodily skills in action, I establish the core of the 
technicity of agency. The aim of these three discussions is to reach an understand-
ing of the particularity of the technicity of action.
IV.A. RULE-FOLLOWING AND JUDGMENT; PRIMARY TECHNICITY
What is the typical rule-following or patterned nature of the deployment of bodily 
skills that can account for both internalized constraints to standardized discipline, 
and perfectly acceptable and sophisticated actions such as paying attention, play-
ing musical instruments, arriving on time for appointments, or remaining steady 
under stress?
The manner in which human agents follow rules evidently corresponds neither 
to the determinism with which objects follow natural laws, nor to the idea of a free-
standing rational subject that prescribes to him-/herself instructions to be performed 
like a theater script.29 There is really no rule that explains bodily skill. The “rule” of 
this regularity of action lies rather in the description and schematization of action 
after the event. Typically, such descriptions and schematizations refer to patterns 
or standards to which people tend to conform. Now, these regularities result from 
the fact that the body is only able to act thanks to the bodily skills with which it 
has gradually been “equipped” through the processes of habituation or exercise. 
To be more precise, everybody is equipped—or disciplined—to perform a specific 
series of movements or gestures (or to adopt certain states, such as composure) and 
to perform them in a particular manner—and not another series. To be skilful in 
performing series x of activities and not series y does not mean that an agent will 
never execute an action from series y, but that his/her skilfulness facilitates actions 
from series x and hence promotes the launching of chains of actions in which the 
practical advantages of these skills can be drawn on. At the same time, and by 
default, other actions and other ways of performing them remain more difficult; 
hence, launching chains of action in which these actions are integrated would be 
met with more resistance. As a result, it is less probable that an agent would execute 
a way of performing an action in which the agent has had no practice, without such 
unfamiliar ways of performing actions thereby becoming entirely impossible (except 
in some borderline cases). Thus, bodily skills dispose their agents to act in a more 
or less regular, stable and recognizable manner—through an effect of the contrast 
between facilitation and absence of facilitation30 that we may call a ‘disposition.’ 
The pronunciation and diction that someone employs in a particular language 
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may be taken as a paradigmatic example. The fact that these skills remain only 
relatively stable—in other words, that they are subject to factors that may change 
them gradually—is already implied here (see section III for further elaboration).
However, the power at work in this disposition is not deployed in identical ways 
in the divergent contexts in which an agent acts. When an agent acts in relatively 
similar contexts in relatively similar ways, this repetition constitutes an exercise 
or practice in the ability or skill to perform the action in that specific manner. In 
fact, frequent engagement with relatively similar contexts of action is a condition 
for the development of bodily skills. When an agent acts under conditions at odds 
with the usual circumstances, the degree to which the performed action diverges 
from the exact manner in which it was executed habitually contributes to the shift 
in the manner in which the agent will be disposed to execute that action (since 
what Aristotle claimed for virtues holds equally for skills: one acquires them by 
practising them).
Since one acts under a variety of conditions, ranging from the familiar to the 
unfamiliar, bodily skills do not guide the power to act in an identical manner each 
time one acts, and in every context of action. There is a gap (Taylor 1999, 41 speaks 
of a “phronetic gap,” a gap of judgment) between the kind of action to which an 
agent’s bodily skills tend to predispose that agent, and the real action performed 
in a specific practical context. There are a number of reasons why there has to be 
such a gap. Firstly, the condition of the body is not always identical. Secondly, the 
contexts of action may differ. Thirdly, different skills are combined with others in 
the flux of action, sometimes in familiar combinations, sometimes in new combi-
nations. It is because of these traits of action that bodily skills, although they are 
responsible for the regularity of action, cannot be reduced simply to generators of 
mechanical repetition (even if such reduction may occur in practice under oppres-
sive circumstances). Rather, the deployment of bodily skills always involves at 
least a certain degree of judgment regarding the practical fit31 of agent and context 
(although this tends to be negligible under extremely familiar circumstances). This 
judgment depends on constant non-conscious, tacit interpretation, rather than on 
conscious thematizing and calculation.
I accept the term that Bourdieu assigned to this form of interpretation, namely 
a “sense for the game” (sens du jeu) (Bourdieu 1980, 111–112).32 Bourdieu’s theory 
of practice, as a former collaborator explains,
thus opposes a conception of conduct as the execution of external rules that 
take effect in the juridical manner of laws, with the internalisation and in-
corporation of schemas that provide the possibility to act with discernment 
without recourse to injunctions, prescriptions or prohibitions that are intended 
to be followed literally. (Boltanski 1990, 254)
This “sense for the game” that bridges the gap between the skilful agent and 
his/her practical action is thus more than “know-how”; it is less a tacit “know-how” 
than a tacit “finding-how” that is responsible for the fine adjustments of action in 
practice,33 even if the relative regularity with which certain actions are repeated 
in similar contexts confers on them a familiarity equivalent to “know-how.” In 
other words, every disposition to act in one or other particular manner (to “follow 
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rules”) nonetheless remains dependent on judgment regarding the agent’s adap-
tation to a context and to specific skills involved in actions. Moreover, since in 
regular dispositions it is the capacity to act itself that is at stake, every string of 
actions is underpinned by the functioning of putting into practice the bodily skills 
that (at least in part) make that string of actions possible (cf. Giddens 1984, 5–6; 
Taylor 1999, 34). The capacitating function I describe here, with the singular 
bodily skills in mind, under certain conditions, puts in place life routines (sets of 
repeated coordinated action, of more or less stable cohesion), through the bodily 
skills themselves, because of the physical and technical context and, possibly, 
interaction with other people.34
Hereafter, I use the term ‘primary technicity’35 to refer to the bodily skills, their 
familiar enactment and their possible combination and extensions in larger com-
plexes, routines.36 Primary technicity may be exercised mostly through interaction 
with other agents, and may be supported by technical means. However, these two 
recurrent traits are neither the sufficient nor the necessary conditions of primary 
technicity. It should already be clear that this notion of technicity has the particularity 
that it is non-teleological: the means-ends schema is not a necessary condition of 
primary technicity, even if primary technicity allows its teleological transformation. 
This idea is elucidated later (section IV.B), when it can be contrasted with secondary, 
teleological technicity. We approach this question now, albeit obliquely, by turning 
to the question of the relation of technicity to creativity in action.
IV.B. MUTUAL IMPLICATION OF TECHNICITY AND  
CREATIVITY OF ACTION: SECONDARY TECHNICITY
The previous section has already suggested problematizing the widespread idea 
of technical action as the opposite of, or as a threat to, the creativity of action. The 
coup de grâce can be delivered to this idea by examining the relation between the 
technicity and the creativity of action. Hans Joas’s (1992) work on the creativity 
of action is of immeasurable value here, since it will allow us to grasp this relation 
as one of mutual implication.
Instead of considering the creativity of action as the last in a series of types in 
a typology of action, Joas (1992, 213) explicitly rejects the principle of typology 
formation, where creativity would in any case be seen only as a watered-down 
form of rational action. Instead, Joas (1992, 213) formulates a theory of creativity 
as a dimension of all human action. Correspondingly, creativity is a dimension of 
the traditionally identified types of action, be it instrumental action or normative 
action. My project corresponds with that of Joas in three important points. Firstly, 
like Joas, I resist approaching the question of technicity in action by means of an 
action typology (in my case this is justified by exposing its weakness in Aristotle, 
as an example). Secondly, I attempt rather to understand an aspect of (almost) all 
action—that is technicity in my case, and creativity in Joas. Thirdly, I also strive 
to find a perspective that values this aspect neither positively nor negatively, as 
Joas does.
According to Joas, creativity as an aspect of all action has to be caught in ac-
tion, as it were, in the uninterrupted flux of everyday action that fluctuates between 
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unreflective routine doing, and episodes in which this comfortable doing is frustrated 
or challenged. Since action consequently continuously has to negotiate familiar and 
unfamiliar conditions of acting, there is a repeated need for reorientation in acting. 
The ability of a routinized agent to adapt in action to the changes and unexpected 
turns in events is what Joas (1992, 190) sees as creativity. He thus understands 
creativity—in line with the American pragmatism37 that informs his entire under-
taking—by situating it in action, rather than in the consciousness (Joas 1992, 190).
In order to reveal the particularity and significance of his perspective on the 
creativity of all human action, Joas contrasts this perspective with the dominant 
means-ends schema of rational action, which is submitted to critique in the same 
movement. Theories that take such a point of departure for theorizing action typi-
cally presuppose “firstly that the actor is capable of purposive action, secondly that 
he has control over his own body, and thirdly that he is autonomous vis-à-vis his 
fellow human beings and environment” (Joas 1992, 217 / 1996, 147). Correspond-
ingly, Joas reviews the “intentional character of human action, the specific bodiliness 
and the originary sociality of the human ability to act” (Joas 1992, 217 / 1996, 148, 
translation modified). An examination of the former would be sufficient to point out 
the relation between the creativity and the technicity of action. The idea that action 
is best or primarily to be understood within a means-ends schema is underpinned 
by the assumption that human knowledge has its origin in the thinking subject 
who establishes a relation to a world constituted of facts (Tatsachen), by selecting 
and ordering these facts, and that human intelligence thus consists primarily of the 
action-independent epistemological capacity (Joas 1992, 230–231). As a result, the 
natural or initial condition of the human being would be one of rest, during which 
the detached, observing and calculating subject contrives objectives that should, 
according to the demands of rationality, preferably be compromised as little as pos-
sible by habit, tradition or the temptation of immediately available means. In other 
words, this teleological view on action starts with the knowing, planning subject 
who deliberates about ends and corresponding means, in a manner free from the 
body, context or other people (Joas 1992, 231–232).
Identifying these assumptions of this teleological understanding of action 
does not amount to denying that a human being can reflect about action or that 
agents use means to enhance the efficiency of their action—which I shall shortly 
affirm. Rather, identifying these assumptions serves to question the elevation of the 
teleological model of action to the originary or primary perspective on action. Joas 
questions these assumptions by recognising that reflection is incorporated into the 
continuous stream of action that constitutes everyday life and thus, according their 
due primary position in reflection on action to the necessary bodiliness, situation-
relatedness and sociality of action. Things are accessible to humans, first, in and 
through practical interaction. This continuous practical interaction is based on the 
bodily and striving directedness to, and in response to, the agent’s context of action 
that, in turn, happens only on the strength of the body’s capabilities, habits and 
relations with the environment (Joas 1992, 232).38
The importance of this point in Joas’s argument should not be underesti-
mated, because, on the strength thereof, he would have to concede that the kind of 
non-teleological action theory that subtends his notion of creativity presupposes 
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the technical or skilled body in terms very close to what I have presented above. 
Consequently, Joas would have to acknowledge (1) that there is no creativity of 
action if it is not innovation on the basis of a skilled interaction with the world.39 
He would also have to admit (2) that this skilled interaction with the world exists 
only as primary technicity and (3) that primary technicity would have to be as 
non-teleological as the creativity that he defends.
This demonstration of the mutual implication of the creativity and the primary 
technicity of action can be strengthened and elaborated by drawing on Joas’s own 
views on the instrumental, or rather the teleological, aspect of action. This then 
allows the introduction of the notion of secondary technicity as derivative of this 
technico-creative complex.
As stated above, Joas defends the pragmatic conviction that reflection on action, 
objectivization and the conscious setting of goals grow from the frustration and 
failure of striving action.40 Moreover, it is exactly from such moments of frustra-
tion and failure that the restructuring, innovative functioning—the creativity—of 
action takes effect. It falls beyond the scope of this article to discuss how Joas 
subsequently derives the teleological capability (which I refer to as ‘secondary 
technicity,’ that is, the capability for calculative and strategic selection and use 
of various means in order to attain goals set in advance) from this originary view 
on action. However, note that his understanding of teleological capability plays 
a crucial role in preventing Joas’s insistence that action is context-dependent and 
responsive from degenerating into behaviouristic determinism. The spontaneous 
creativity that characterises action on an original level (as demonstrated) and the 
teleological capability that is a secondary derivative thereof remain in a relation 
of mutual supposition in human action (Joas 1992, 236).
In my view, it would be invalid to conclude that technicity is a secondary 
form of action, derived from a more originary creative aspect of action (even if we 
grant Joas’s claim that there is a relation of mutual supposition between creativity 
and teleological calculation). It seems more convincing to conclude that when one 
situates the technicity of human action en bloc in the teleological derivative of the 
originary creativity of action, then the most original form of the technicity of action 
has already been missed. In the light of the examinations (above) of rule-following 
and judgment as essential to the technicity of action, it seems more plausible to 
affirm through this alternative route that the technicity of action is characterized by 
the creative enactment of the body’s acquired skills, since in practically all action 
the body’s striving to act in a context is facilitated through more or less standardized 
skills, and since this “application of rules in action” normally consists of variations 
on the theme of “finding-how” in action (and only under pathogenic circumstances 
identical repetition of patterns).
In conclusion, there are at least two reasons why the technicity and the creativity 
of action cannot be separated. Firstly, Joas’s reason: without the teleological capa-
bility, which I call ‘secondary technicity,’ the effect of the milieu or the context of 
action on action would be so direct that action would tend to be determined by the 
milieu in a behaviouristic manner. Secondly, my reason: technicity and creativity 
are inseparable, because the originary creativity of action already presupposes a 
relation to something that is more originary than the teleological capability, namely 
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the primary technicity of action.41 This idea can be schematically reformulated: 
technicity and creativity presuppose each other, with regard to both the disposition 
or capability to act (cf. hexis) and the reflexive influence that thought and planning 
can have on it (meta logou).42
In order to consolidate this conclusion, let us return to the interpretative quality 
of the hexis meta logou.
IV.C. INTERPRETATION IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY TECHNICITY
In section II of this study, I argued both against and with Aristotle that the core of 
the human ability to act—be it ethico-political action or manufacture—is charac-
terised by a fairly stable acquired capability and disposition to act in certain ways. 
Moreover, this capability, even though it does not participate in human reason, 
stands under the influence and formation of human reason (according to Aristotle’s 
anthropology). It has furthermore been argued that this re-interpretation of Aristotle 
is not an obstacle to a hermeneutic re-appropriation of Aristotle’s categories in the 
manner initiated by Heidegger. Working on a contemporary, anthropological re-
actualization of the hermeneutic re-appropriation of Aristotle, it has been argued 
in section II.A above that the “rule-following” nature of the deployment of bodily 
skills is usually accompanied by tacit judgment.
The moment of judgment in rule-following can be argued to be a moment 
of the broader interpretative nature of human interaction with the world. I accept 
Heidegger’s concept of the “hermeneutic as” (hermeneutisches Als) as the key to 
understanding the connection between judgment and interpretation. Accordingly, 
judgment, as connecting a subject to a predicate (S is P), has to be considered as 
a specialization of a more originary interpretation, consisting in viewing or using 
something as something.43 When we use something, Heidegger explains,
that which is [by so doing] designated is understood as that as which we 
are to take the thing in question. . . . The “as” makes up the structure of the 
explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation. 
(Heidegger [1927] 1993, 149 / [1962] 1988, 189).
This interpretation does not have to be articulated explicitly (as a judgment), 
since “[a]ny mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something 
which already understands and interprets” (Heidegger [1927] 1993, 149 / [1962] 
1988, 189). In other words, primary technicity participates in the interpretative 
existence of human beings. The anthropological twist I give to Heidegger’s thought 
in this claim is not in direct harmony with the ontological objectives of Heidegger’s 
early thought. However, a path has already been cleared to such a post-Heideggerian 
hermeneutic anthropology by Ricœur (which I simply assume here without review-
ing the intricate justification that such a transformation requires).44
What Ricœur allows us to see—and this is the backbone of his anthropological 
hermeneutic—is that interpretation arises from interaction between agents and the 
products of culture around them, and where the interpretation allows, first of all, a 
glimpse of the interpreter. A reader, in reading a text, first interprets him-/herself as 
reader of the text. My contribution to Ricœur’s argument is to explore the validity of 
this schema in technical matters.45 By analogy to reading, one could, for instance, 
“TECHNOLOGY” AS THE CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY OF HUMAN TECHNICITY 351
argue that when a cyclist rides a bicycle, the cyclist is an agent who enacts acquired 
bodily skills and interprets not only the bicycle as means of transport and the terrain 
through which he/she cycles, but equally the action of cycling and, through all of 
these, him-/herself as cyclist. This process is not entirely different from that of a 
reader reading a book, and one could consequently adopt the metaphor of “read-
ing” as a key to disclose the relation between a skilled body and the means adopted 
in action. Formulated in the terms proposed in this article, one could say that as 
primary technicity unfolds in action, it follows an interpretative or hermeneutic 
spiral, “starting” from the bodily skills, passing through engagement with means 
and artefacts by which the agent comes to a practical understanding of the agent, 
the means, and the ambient world.
The third segment of this spiral, the “reading,” can take two different forms, 
represented by primary and secondary technicity. Either the interpretative quality 
of technicity unfolds itself tacitly in action, as when we lose ourselves in doing 
something (primary technicity) or, due to whatever factor of disturbance or joy, 
the deployment of skills and the means for and context of their deployment are 
subjected to conscious attention and planning (secondary technicity). However, in 
both cases, a similar interpretative spiral is followed.
In every action, the possibilities of a particular agent are, then, interpreted in 
practice in the specific context of action and through the mediation of means, prob-
ably most of which are technical artefacts. It follows from the preceding discussion 
(section II.A) that such practical interpretation depends on the previously established 
familiarity with action in the world. Moreover, this invites us to reaffirm that the 
interpretation associated with primary technicity is a more primary or “originary” 
phenomenon than the conscious planning of strategy.
It follows that the meaning that is “read” from such events of practical inter-
pretation cannot be reduced to the technical, instrumental meaning of these events, 
and this despite my concern with technicity in this article. In fact, at least three 
kinds of meaning or reference46 need to be distinguished, woven into the very fiber 
of human technicity.
1. The compositional or configurational meaning of the technicity of action. 
This refers to the understanding that an agent has of the internal references 
of the different components of technical artefacts and procedures to each 
other—be it the assembly of machines or the coordination of workers—or, 
to put it simply, the understanding of technical events, as may be repre-
sented on a flow diagram and where the relations are based purely on the 
technical qualities of the components of the process.
2. The meaning of usage of the technicity of action. This meaning emerges 
from the framework of the utilisation of a means of action that is open to 
different uses: when something is used as this or that, the agent, means 
and action derive a practical meaning. This is even more evident in the 
wide variety of cases where this meaning is derived from a consciously 
set project. Through the execution of the projected task, the project can 
obviously also be adapted, in which case, the usage meaning of the ele-
ments involved then also changes.
ERNST WOLFF352
3. All technicity also has a symbolic meaning by which the technicity of ac-
tion advances or frustrates social values. Think, for instance, of values such 
as precision, beauty, fashion, sophistication or environmental sensitivity 
that form and inform all technical processes (and see the discussion below 
on the dialectic of technicity and symbolics). Without these values, the 
vital ingredient of the technicity—namely standards of excellence—would 
not exist.
It is the meaning of usage and the symbolic meaning that constitute the “world-
liness” of the technicity of action; they nonetheless remain inseparably linked to 
the compositional meaning.
Instead of demonstrating that the hermeneutic spiral of the technicity of ac-
tion, through which these three interrelated forms of meaning are active, is an 
integral part of our human existence, I shall merely illustrate it with two facts.47 
Firstly, people continuously play a series of relatively stable social and symboli-
cally shaped technical roles: the roles of profession, age, gender—none of which 
can be understood without the hermeneutic spiral of technicity described above. 
Each of these roles includes a set of specific bodily skills, means, criteria for their 
excellence, etc., irrespective of whether the skill involves walking in high-heeled 
shoes, shaking hands with a firm grip, talking with the voice inflections of a radio 
announcer, concentrating on what a lecturer says, and so forth. Secondly, what is 
commonly considered “good” behavior in a given social context cannot be per-
formed without the acquisition of virtues and (as has been argued in section II with 
and against Aristotle) virtues are very often acquired and improved in concert with 
the technicity of action. Where would one acquire the ability to act with patience, 
economy, constancy or perseverance, amongst others, if not through the exercise 
of the technicity of action, for example, manual work or sport?
It should be clear that, although the symbolic character of these illustra-
tions—the phenomenon of technical roles and the characteristics of excellence in 
action—is salient, it is insufficient to represent either (technical roles or ideals of 
excellence) without their technical aspect. This is the level of ambition for my claim 
about the technicity of agency and action: agency and action cannot be reduced to 
their technical aspect, but cannot be understood properly without it either, even in 
cases where the technical aspect does not immediately meet the eye. The double 
negative—not without—is crucial here.
V. TECHNICITY IS INTERWOVEN WITH OTHER 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASPECTS
In the introduction (section I), I postulated that the social, symbolic and technical 
aspects of human existence are equally the matter of understanding or interpreta-
tion. While I have for the sake of presentation limited my view up to now to the 
individual agent, the technicity of action and interaction is far more complex. The 
formation, deployment and change of bodily skills involve a decentering in respect 
of the individual agent’s body to different spheres outside of the technicity of the 
skilful agent. Because the bodily skills always function in “symbiosis” with mostly 
non-technical phenomena, the technicity of action of necessity remains interwoven 
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with other anthropological aspects in the flux of interpretative existence. I discuss 
five such dialectical relations in which the technical agent participates in the broader 
phenomenon of human existence:
V.A. DIALECTIC OF THE BODILY SKILLS AND THE  
BIOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE BODY
Since Aristotle, the formation of skill has been seen to occur by processes of 
habituation or of disciplining the body. However, this does not mean that the 
entire body is susceptible to being formed under the pressure of discipline. The 
particularities of each human being’s biological constitution continue to interfere 
with the acquisition and implementation of technical skills. This is clear from the 
role that fatigue, hormones or diet can play in what a technical agent is capable 
of acquiring and exercising as skill. As I argued earlier (section III), the impetus 
(orexis, as Aristotle would say) precedes all technicity and enables its acquisition. 
Hence, the biological condition of the agent (for example, the presence of illness 
or fatigue, or the agent’s level of fitness) feeds directly into the skilful action of the 
agent. However, the biological constitution of the technical agent is not merely the 
domain of passively endured influence; it is also possible to intervene deliberately 
(technically) in the domain of the biological constitution of the technical agent—
in this regard, think of medical interventions that, without directly changing the 
skills of the body, change (positively or negatively) the biological conditions of the 
deployment of these skills. If a medical intervention has long-term or permanent 
outcomes, it could facilitate the acquisition or transformation of skills.48
V.B. DIALECTIC OF THE TECHNICAL AGENT AND  
ELEMENTS OF TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Despite the fact that bodily skills are a quality of the human body, they are ac-
quired by processes of habituation through frequent repetition of certain actions, 
very often with certain objects. Bodily skills therefore involve not only an agent’s 
familiarity with the typical functioning of his/her own body, but familiarity with 
the manner in which the agent’s body is typically capable of responding to the de-
mands of different fields of action and in interaction with the things that typically 
constitute those fields of action. These “things” may include, apart from technical 
artefacts, “thought instruments” such as alphabets, the order of numbers, or the 
idea of a seven-day week, in other words, technologies of attention. Although 
the specifics of technical systems are very important in understanding even the 
technicity of the agent (as can be seen in the key position accorded to technical 
mediation in the agent’s hermeneutic openness to the world49), for the purposes of 
this article, it suffices to indicate the place of technical systems in the technical life 
of the agent.
Interaction with technical artefacts often consists, as already suggested above, 
of interactions with technical systems, rather than with the isolated means alone. 
When disciplining interaction with objects is considered, it should be borne in mind 
that we are speaking of complex systems that may vary in size from the technical 
micro-cosmos (for example, a studio, office or other work space), to the technical 
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meso-cosmos (the larger context, for example, of a factory or an organisation), to 
the macro-scale (a city or a national or international institution)50—with decreasing 
directness of the agent’s influence on the system as a whole.
V.C. DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AGENCY AND  
EXERCISE THROUGH SOCIALIZATION
Although a certain range of the bodily skills is acquired, developed and exercised 
by the single agent, a broad variety of social interactions function as implicit or 
explicit facilitation or sanction of this acquisition, development and exercise. As 
facilitated by social interactions, the formation of the agent’s skill—no matter how 
individualised and contingent the historical process of that formation may be—re-
mains partially of a socialized nature. Consequently, the agent tends to act in ways 
that reflect those typical of a particular social context, and use objects associated 
with that social group, for aims that are, most of the time, not be too unfamiliar to 
that group, and so on. In short, the rules followed by the technical agent include 
social rules. This is why it is possible in a number of technical situations to infer 
something of the social setting by merely examining the characteristics of typical ac-
tions. Consider, for example, the different ways in which people stand comfortably, 
carry objects, bend down, run, set the pace or rhythm of their working tempo. Again, 
the frequent use of typical culturally specific objects tends to promote the formation 
of skills and routines that correspond with the use of these objects, for instance, 
consider the different bodily skills required to eat with one’s hands, chopsticks, or 
with a knife and fork. In turn, becoming acquainted with these different ways of 
eating, the routines that archive the familiarity of eating in these respective ways, 
contributes to identifying someone broadly, for instance, as traditionally African, 
Asian, or European. It is true, of course, that under the influence of globalisation 
there is a tendency in some places where such differences are hybridised, sometimes 
to approximate “dialectal” differences of a fairly homogenous technical world.
The sociality of the acquisition and practice of the technicity of agency is thus 
an indisputable reality. However, it is equally important to notice the particular 
form in which individual agents acquire skills under social pressure (for example, 
because of specifics of their bodily condition, their talent and aptitude to learn and 
other factors), and how individuals are entangled in different life narratives, pos-
sibly corresponding with divergent social pressures and relations to social groups. 
Such pressures and relations may fragment and thus obscure the effect of social 
processes of learning.
V.D. DIALECTIC OF INDIVIDUAL AND ASSOCIATIVE ACTION
Technical agency is formed and activated not only in interaction with the constitutive 
objects of that domain, but also in collaboration with other incarnate, organizational 
and institutional subjects. Acting is thus rarely ascribable to an isolated individual 
agent or to a homogenous social unit—in this case, not because of the sociality of 
the acquisition of skill, but because of the sociality of interaction.
The technicity of action is therefore situated in an association of co-agents, 
whose level of collaboration can be represented on a scale ranging from close 
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interaction in tightly woven networks of the agent in collective agency (as typically 
found in a well-motivated sports team) to the episodic, short- or long-term coordi-
nation of relatively independent projects in a contractual agency (as required, for 
instance, in complex manufacturing projects, like that of passenger aeroplanes). 
In none of the forms of associative agency that lie between these two poles can 
the result of action be attributed simply to the sum of individual agents’ projects. 
Besides, the more tightly the network of associative actors is bound, the more the 
ensuing associative action would tend to display something like a collective style, 
due to the increased importance of intercorporiety and the corresponding “co-world” 
of the participating agents.51
V.E. DIALECTIC OF THE TECHNICITY OF ACTION AND THE 
SYMBOLIC AND LINGUISTIC ORDER
The symbolic and linguistic order here refers to the widest concept of representa-
tions that may be present in the human mind or that may have an impact on it. 
Unconsciously such images or ideas feed into continuous activation of bodily skills 
(primary technicity), for instance, reluctance toward risk-taking, the traditionality 
of actions, or personal aspiration. These images or ideas also inform conscious 
planning of and deliberation on action (in the sense of secondary technicity) in 
purposive training to change bodily skills, practising counter culture, invention, the 
subjection of technical processes to non-technical standards or criteria of excel-
lence, such as beauty or safety.
Again, the symbols or symbolic complexes that may influence technical 
agency may be ascribed to an individual’s creativity. But more often these symbolic 
complexes belong to groups or societies. This is true independent of the degree of 
conscious knowledge of and engagement with those symbols by the agents. On 
the level of individual or group agency, we might think of personal aspirations or 
convictions that might influence the deployment of technical skill. On the level of 
cultural groups or societies, it is rather the silent workings of ideology that come to 
mind. Here, Max Weber’s theory of the Protestant work ethic serves as an excellent 
example:52 through the effective transmission of a symbolic system (the disenchant-
ing Protestant theology), people in modern Western Europe and North America 
have acquired the habitus of acting in a frugal manner. Once frugality has taken 
root, not only through the transmission of the Protestant ethical ideas, but through 
the practice of “innerworldly asceticism,” the world order that came about as result 
of this new form of work (namely, modern industrial society) served to maintain 
this habitus of frugality (and everything associated with it)—and it is this training 
by the socio-technical order that Weber calls the “iron cage.”
In these five ways individuals’ technical agency appears organically linked 
with aspects of human existence that are not technical in nature. Neglecting the 
significance of these non-technical aspects of human agency for individual techni-
cal agency would distort our understanding of the phenomenon of the technicity 
of agency beyond recognition. The opposite is equally true: none of these other 
aspects of being human can be contemplated plausibly without recognizing the 
place of technicity in these aspects.
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VI. “TECHNOLOGY” AS CRITICAL DISCOURSE:  
ITS POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS
Thus far the discussion has centered on “technology” as a rational discourse 
describing the technicity of action. Having developed a framework in which to 
present the value and scope of such a discourse, I now turn to how the discourse 
on the technicity of action may be “critical.” The adjective ‘critical’ refers—over 
and beyond the wish to analyze the phenomenon of the technicity of action accu-
rately and to situate it in a sophisticated manner in the context of human life—to a 
normative discourse, according to which the better forms of human technicity may 
be distinguished from the undesirable ones (in other words, evaluation in terms 
other than expediency, efficiency or even beauty), or to be more exact, a norma-
tive discourse by which to expose or diagnose faults in the social conditions that 
obstruct people’s self-realisation (according to our Honnethian (1999) definition, 
presented earlier in section I). “Technology” as critical discourse has to be able 
to comment on ways in which the social condition of the technicity of action in 
a particular context contributes to or infringes on people’s lives and wellbeing. If 
the technicity of action is spread over practically all parts of human existence, then 
this critical discourse would have to extend equally wide.
To justify the normative potential of an intelligent discourse on the technicity 
of action is an enormous task. For the purposes of this article, I limit my efforts to 
presenting the essence of such a normative discourse of technicity by returning to 
the Aristotelian (and somewhat anti-Aristotelian) definition of skill that I argued 
for earlier (section II.B):
Skill, then, is a disposition of choice in matters of the mean relative to us, 
the choice is made in accordance with reason and is ideally executed as the 
person gifted in technical reason would do it. It is a mean between two flaws, 
one of excess, the other of deficiency, and where this mean can be described 
in terms of the discernible increments on the continuums of all the categories 
that determine the particular quality of an action (its agent, object, instrument, 
manner, time, place, duration, reason, purpose) between the two flaws.
It is well known that the core conviction of Aristotle’s ethics (and similarly of 
all virtue ethics53) is that the practice of virtues represents the internal conditions 
for a flourishing life (eudaimonia)54 and that the virtuous life is thus a good life.
As an extension of the Aristotelian framework that has guided my argument 
thus far, I shall now attempt to demonstrate what the value—and limits—of af-
firming a similar normativity for skill would be. In other words, the core of the 
proposed Aristotelian critique of the technicity of action resides in affirming the 
normative assumption that it is good for people to act and to be able to excel in ac-
tion. Besides, if phronésis and techné overlap as I argue in section II, then it seems 
plausible that the good life does not depend only on virtuous action, but also on 
skilful action (provided that skill is understood in the terms set out in this article). 
Accordingly, the merit of a negative formulation of the same assumption has to be 
acknowledged too: where the skilfulness of action is undermined, excellence of 
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the action is threatened, and since virtuous action depends on skilful action (see 
section II.B), the ability to flourish in life would be endangered.
In arriving at this conclusion I have gone a long way toward relativizing the 
distinction between phronésis and techné. However, I have not conflated the two 
terms completely, nor do I advocate considering them on absolutely equal terms. 
Skill cannot give to itself the ultimate justification or limits of its practice. This 
insistence on this inability of skill is not a deus ex machina in terms of my argument 
thus far. The exact place of this inability and its interlinking with considerations 
from the symbolic order (ethical, moral and political, in this case) have been de-
marcated at two places in the argument above: first, in the insistence on a symbolic 
meaning of technical action (point 3. in section IV.C); second, in presenting this 
same phenomenon from the point of view of the dialectic between technical ac-
tion and the symbolic and linguistic order (section V.E). That said, reaffirming that 
ethical decisions ultimately cannot be reduced to technicity does not mean that I 
wish to resuscitate the separation between ethical life and technical life. It is the 
great merit of Weber’s thought on political responsibility that he argued this point: 
in order to act according to one’s judgments regarding what is just and unjust, in 
other words, to give reality to such judgments, considerations of technicity (for 
example, strategy, collaboration, use of means, compromise) have to be taken into 
consideration from the outset.55 In short, the technicity of action should inform 
responsible deliberation about ethical and political action. It almost goes without 
saying for a readership of social scientists that the ethical and the political cannot 
be reduced to the technical without catastrophic consequences.
On the other hand, reducing the technicity of action to the mere deployment 
of instrumental reason or elevating efficiency to the exclusive value of human 
technicity both amount to amputating technicity from its essential implication in 
non-technical aspects of human existence. It is to commit violence to the primary, 
non-teleological nature of the technicity of action and/or to miss the plurality of 
ways in which human beings in different spheres justify their actions.56 Formulated 
negatively, the critical strike of “technology” is aimed against both the technicist 
reduction of human technicity (the reduction of human technicity to a specific type 
of action, which moreover is considered through the lens of the teleological preju-
dice) and the anti-technical marginalization of human technicity (the attempt to ban 
technicity from human nature or to limit it to certain types of action).57 These two 
tendencies that distort the human being as technical agent would most often result 
in techno-optimism and techno-pessimism, respectively. Formulated positively, 
“technology” as critical discourse on human technicity is guided by the desire to 
gain insight into the full potential of the development of human agency, since it is 
a condition for the possibility of ethical, as well as moral and political excellence.
Since space limitations do not permit a full discussion, I briefly summarize 
the typical pathologies or distortions that may arise as a result of the distortion of 
the technicity of action from a technicist reduction or anti-technical marginaliza-
tion in the Table 1 (next page). This brief presentation will have to be followed up 
on another occasion by a detailed discussion and justification. Nonetheless, in its 
current format, the contents of the table should suffice to demonstrate the critical 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the left-hand column, the technicity of the human being in its five-fold dia-
lectics is represented (as in section V, above). In the right-hand column, an idea is 
given of what the optimal manifestation of human technicity would be, according 
to each of the five dialectics. In terms of the argument above, this optimal mani-
festation of human technicity represents the part of the definition of skill identified 
with “as the person gifted in technical reason would do it.” The two center col-
umns represent the two sides of flaws (as in the definition of skill), in other words, 
pathological relations to human technicity. The underlying structure of this table 
therefore reflects not only the excesses and deficiencies that have to be prevented 
through a judicious perspective on technicity, but also an indication of the excel-
lence that should be sought between these two flawed extremes.58 One aspect of 
excellent human action is the ability to realise skilfulness in different contexts and 
under different conditions of the justification of action (what Aristotle calls “the 
mean relative to us”)—not only in the critical analysis performed after action by 
social scientists, but especially in the practice itself.
Two dimensions of this appreciative vision on the excellence of skilful action 
and the critical vision of the distortions thereof need to be underscored. First, while 
providing the framework for the normative potential of “technology,” this frame-
work simultaneously provides an outline of the technicity of ethico-political agency 
and action itself. Second, nothing further is claimed in this normative framework, 
aside from articulating the technical conditions of ethics, in other words, of the 
wish to live well, the realization of which aspiration is an essential component of 
self-esteem. In formulating the “ethics” of technicity in this Ricœurian parlance, 
I invite the reader to place this ethics in a theoretically irresolvable tension with 
the moral discourse on universalizability, as Ricœur does. This tension can, as 
Ricœur argued, only be solved in practice by prudent, responsible action.59 Such 
responsible action would in turn require, amongst other things, creative technicity 
for its practical realization.
The critical social theory of human technicity is never elevated in my argument 
to the sole or decisive normative discourse on action. The highest ambition for the 
normative potential of “technology” as critical discourse can again be formulated 
with a double negative: the ethical aim for the good life cannot be realized without 
due consideration for the optimal condition of technicity (nor can the good life be 
realized without the technicity of action); and if ethics remains bound, in tension, 
with morality, this tension can only be resolved in practice, which in turn cannot 
happen without creative technicity.
ENDNOTES
* During this article’s long gestation, I was able to read drafts and parts of this article at 
conferences and in guest lectures in Bochum (2009), Pretoria (2011), Rochester (2012), 
Antwerp (2012), and Paris (2013). I thank my hosts and interlocutors for engaging in debate 
with me, and for their helpful suggestions. A much shorter version of sections of the current 
article first appeared under the title “Tegnologie as kritiese sosiale teorie” in Tydskrif vir 
Geesteswetenskappe 52(1), March 2012, 36–51. Some of the current content is translated 
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from the earlier version. I thank the editors of that journal and of the Journal of Philosophi-
cal Research for accepting this overlap.
1. The scope of the present article prohibits an exhaustive overview. For the purposes of the 
study, suffice it to refer to the vast compendium of attitudes and opinions held and defended 
over the centuries on the relation between human beings and technology presented in Johan 
Hendrik van der Pot’s Encyclopedia of Technological Progress: A Systematic Overview of 
Theories and Opinions, 2004. Among the classical philosophical overviews that speak to 
the present issue, see Mitcham 1994, Part 1 and Feenberg 2002, chapter 1.
2. Given the limited scope of an article, it is not feasible to present the comprehensive 
literature review required for such a project. Key references are provided, as the aim of the 
study is to demonstrate the plausibility of this long, transversal approach; the debate with 
other sources is left for a monograph. I refer to a number of my own studies in which aspects 
of these debates may be studied.
3. An overview of this development from Schleiermacher, to Dilthey and Heidegger can 
be found in Ricœur 1986, 83–111 and in Grondin 2006, 14–42.
4. In this context we might consider the work of philosophers such as Don Ihde or Bernhard 
Irrgang. It is important to read the ideas I propose as being in debate with their work, but 
doing so explicitly goes beyond the scope of the current study. The same constraints oblige 
me to limit my debate with significant authors working on action theory and agency to a 
few brief remarks where apposite.
5. While the current study aims to establish what exactly may be understood as “technics” 
or “the technicity of action,” a few preliminary pointers for the definition are in order regard-
ing my understanding of “technics.” In his discussion of the notion of “Technik,” Günther 
Ropohl (1999) distinguishes both a broad and narrow usage of the term. Referring to the 
notion of “Technik im allgemeinen” of Gottl-Ottlilienfeld as the foremost representative 
of the broad use of “Technik,” Ropohl justifies his preference for not using the term in this 
broad way “because it would bring all human praxis in play and no sector would be de-
marcated” (1999, 30). These are precisely two of the reasons why I do opt for such a broad 
notion of the “technical” or “technicity.” Furthermore, I decline Ropohl’s own suggestion 
for a medium-range notion of “Technik”—he suggests speaking “always and only then of 
“technics” [Technik] when objects are artificially made by humans and used for specific 
ends.” The justification for my rejection of such a medium-range notion is that it seems to 
promote the prejudice of narrowing down “Technik” to the use of instrumental reason from 
the outset.
Since I explicitly include the unreflective deployment of bodily skills in the definition of the 
technical, my understanding thereof is broad, so as to include both moments of Hickman’s 
definition: “Technology in its most robust sense, then, involves the invention, development, 
and cognitive deployment of tools and other artefacts brought to bear on raw materials and 
intermediate stock parts, with a view to the resolution of perceived problems. Technology in 
this sense is what establishes and maintains the stable technical platforms—the habitualized 
tools, artefacts, and skills—that allow us to continue to function and flourish,” Hickman 
2001, 12. Obviously, one does not have to share the value judgment built into the last phrase 
of this definition.
6. Two decades later, the “technical turn in philosophy and social theory,” see Feenberg 
1995, had still only unfolded to a modest extent, despite advances in Science and Technol-
ogy Studies, Digital Humanities, the continued study of material culture, etc.
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7. This understanding of critique is directly derived from Honneth 1999, 370 and 388–390. 
The above outline of my intention with “technology as critical social theory” should already 
reveal my proximity to Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of technology. I share, inter alia, 
his polemics with essentialism, his approach to technology as medium of human life, his 
desire to identify social pathologies without abandoning emancipatory or democratic ac-
tion—see Feenberg 1999. However, my affinity is rather with the more recent critical theory 
from Frankfurt, as could partially be seen in the way I will deal with pathologies against the 
background of a general anthropological theory. This obliges me to underplay the importance 
of modernity during the initial development of my theory, over against the predominance of 
modernity as frame of reflection in Feenberg’s work, see, for example, Feenberg 1995. But 
more substantially, I aim to offer the fuller theory of the technicity of action, which remains 
relatively underdeveloped in his work despite the important inspiration he derives, amongst 
others, from constructivism (see further detail in Feenberg 1999, chapter 5).
8. However, the wide use of the term “technology” has significant historical antecedents 
(see Meier-Oeser 1998) and has found its way into contemporary philosophy of technology 
at least in the case of Günter Ropohl’s Allgemeine Technologie, 1999.
9. See Ricœur 2004, 181. Ricœur’s hermeneutics of the capable human being is found in 
Ricœur 1990a. For a reading of the technicity of Ricœur’s “capable human being” see Wolff 
2013.
10. This can be traced back clearly to Heidegger’s Natorp Bericht [1922] 2003. Franco 
Volpi’s 1988 essay gives an excellent account of this reinterpretation of Aristotle in Sein 
und Zeit.
11. See for instance the manner in which Ricœur’s hermeneutics of narrative—in which he 
insists on the long detour through the study of texts nonetheless ends up in a reflection on 
historical thinking that is explicitly devoted to action, see Ricœur 1985, chapter 7.
12. Expressed at length in Wolff 2008.
13. In a similar fashion my undertaking also remains critical in its appropriation of the 
broader phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition, in which technicity rarely got (or gets) 
its due. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine my reasons for turning to the early 
Heidegger (despite my objections) at the expense of his later philosophy where technology 
is more directly thematized. For current purposes, see the significant evaluation of this part 
of Heidegger’s later philosophy by Séris 1994, chapter 7: “Métaphysique et essence de la 
technique: Heidegger.”
14. The exposition on Aristotle that follows takes up some elements of an earlier study 
(Wolff 2008), but refines and develops them further.
15. I refer throughout to the bilingual edition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 2003.
16. And even then, how does one practise a virtue for itself without technical support? How 
could one, for instance, be simply patient, without being patient while struggling to play the 
piano?
17. I follow here, the excellent exposition on the mean by Michael Pakaluk 2005, 110 ff.
18. These conclusions contradict Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, and thus oppose the 
implicit “ethics” of authenticity of Sein und Zeit, but none of these conclusions interfere 
with the Heideggerian generalization of hermeneutics, to which I remain indebted.
19. The problems that are created are rather Heidegger’s (his understanding of “authentic” 
and “inauthentic” existence would be seriously affected, for example) and do not affect the 
concerns set out in this study.
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20. The aim of this section is to show the way towards an independent reflection on the 
skilful body in response to the preceding reading of Aristotle. However, it will be clear to 
the reader that what follows is developed mostly against the background of the phenom-
enological tradition in a broad sense. Important elements of this tradition could be traced 
from Husserl [1930] 1973, §32 and [1939] 1999, §25, to Heidegger’s presentation of “das 
Man,” especially Heidegger [1927] 1993, §27, to Merleau-Ponty 1945, 166 ff and 177 ff, 
to Ricœur 1950, 264–290, and to Bourdieu, despite his critique of phenomenology, 1972, 
256–320 and 1980, 87–134.
21. Bodily technics, techniques and technologies are possible translations, but each of these 
results in some undesirable ambiguities.
22. Unsatisfactory translations of the French ‘gigoter.’
23. This move is necessitated not only by the aim of providing a plausible account of the 
technicity of action (including its non-technical origins) from the earliest infanthood, but to 
formulate this account of action in a manner that allows for non-rational and not (necessarily) 
normative action in later life. For the significance of this idea, see Hans Joas and Wolgang 
Knöbl’s assessment of Herder’s contribution on expressive acts in Joas and Knöbl 2004, 
77–79.
24. This striving corresponds with Aristotle’s notion of orexis (commonly translated as 
‘desire’), but also with the temporal projections or “ek-stasis” in Heidegger.
25. See Marc Breviglieri’s exploration of the “inner certainty of being able” that resides in 
the sensitive experience of the vital functions and that he argues makes the acquisition and 
exercise of capabilities possible, (in Breviglieri 2012).
26. The notion of “familiarity” is borrowed from Heidegger and is an essential component 
of the potential of opening something like a “world” in interaction with things; the notion 
“world” is derived from the same context, see especially Heidegger [1927] 1993, §§16 and 
31.
27. See the classical studies of Leroi-Gourhan, 1943, and Gilles 1978, 121–176, as well as 
the more recent book of François Sigaut 2012. See also the religious uses of bodily skills 
in Pottier 1990.
28. That is, in contradistinction to the manner in which objects follow rules or laws. The 
specificity of rule-following in action is shared to a certain extent by certain animals.
29. This insight has been analysed perceptively by Robert Bresson 1988 in contrasting the 
natural agency of actors for film with played agency of actors in theatre. The beginning of 
this discussion draws from an earlier study (see Wolff 2010, and also the valuable exposition 
on rule following in Taylor 1999, following Wittgenstein and Bourdieu). The elaboration 
in the present article differs from my previous presentations, in that my insistence on the 
social constitution of learning processes of skill is exaggerated in the earlier work. In the 
current formulation, the particularity of individual learning processes should be articulated 
more clearly, without however neglecting the social dimension of learning.
30. The complex relation between capability and incapability in the finitude of human agency 
has been examined in Wolff 2013. This relation of mutual implication of “capabilisation” 
and constraint is at the core of Foucault’s notion of “discipline,” see Foucault 1975, 161.
31. The term ‘fitting’ is chosen to render the notion of “action qui convient” as developed 
by Thévenot 2006.
32. Provided that I immediately express my doubts that the interpretatively strong version 
of this notion that I advocate (coupled with the factors of defect and talent in acquisition of 
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skill—see section III) will tend to make my notion of “sense for the game” unable to support 
the weight of a theory of social reproduction such as that of Bourdieu.
33. Cf. Levinas [1961] 1998, 180–182 on the essential groping (tâtonnement) nature of all 
action and as condition of technics.
34. One could subscribe at least to the more ethnomethodological parts of the work of La-
tour (and colleagues) in support of the latter half of this claim. See Callon and Latour 1981, 
Latour and Strum 1996, and Latour 1996, where the framing of human action by technical 
dispositives is developed by contrasting it to an “ethnography” of primates. Proper engage-
ment with Latour’s more recent work unfortunately exceeds the limitations of this article.
35. My concepts of primary and secondary technicity of action are not to be confused with 
Feenberg’s primary and secondary instrumentalization—see Feenberg 1999, 202–207 and 
2002, 175–178.
36. Space constraints do not allow me to develop the concept of routines in detail here, 
but it should be sufficiently clear from my references that my preceding analyses could be 
taken as the genealogy of what Giddens calls ‘routinization’ and that he defines as “The 
habitual, taken-for-granted character of the vast bulk of the activities of day-to-day social 
life; the prevalence of familiar styles and forms of conduct, both supporting and supported 
by a sense of ontological security” Giddens 1984, 376.
37. Pragmatism is, in fact, characterised by Joas 1992, 197 as “a theory of situated creativ-
ity.” In the discussion that follows I assume the compatibility of Joas’s pragmatism with the 
relevant aspects of the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions.
38. Here Joas is quite close to the discussion of routine in Giddens 1984, chapter 2.
39. This conclusion is not entirely foreign to that expressed by Berger and Luckmann 1966, 
71: “by providing a stable background in which human activity may proceed with a minimum 
of decision-making most of the time, it frees energy for such decisions as may be necessary 
on certain occasions. In other words, the background of habitualized activity opens up a 
foreground for deliberation and innovation.” However, whereas these authors emphasise the 
passivity of habit, I insist that bodily skills (and their larger complexes, routines) play an 
active role in enabling action and participating in the judgement inherent in action. It should 
be clear that my exposition above is compatible with that of thinkers such as Richard Sennett 
2008, in as far as we limit our view to his rehabilitation of the value of apprenticeship and 
craftsmanship. However, I claim that my exposition reaches deeper phenomenologically, 
which would allow for a more ambivalent description of craftsmanship and a broader socio-
theoretical ambition.
40. This could also be argued by Heideggerian means, by noting his stance on the frustration 
of action (see the excellent commentary of Bernet 1994), and by using as analogy the deri-
vation of language (Sprache) from discourse (Rede), see Heidegger [1927] 1993, 157–158 
and 1976, 153–160.
41. This approach to the technicity of action does not aim at defining human technicity in 
contradistinction to animal technicity (or absence of technicity in animals). In fact, the manner 
in which primary technicity is presented here could possibly be used to describe essential 
aspects of the action of big mammals (at least), where it seems to me absurd to reduce their 
behavior to simple stimulus-response mechanisms. Although the question of animal technic-
ity falls outside of the scope of this article, it can at least be provisionally indicated that the 
dialectics through which the bodily skills are bound with technical means and the symbolic 
order (see discussion below) are responsible for the considerable difference of degree of 
complexity and performance between the technicity of humans and that of other animals.
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42. See section II.C for the importance of and specific re-interpretation of Aristotle’s hexis 
meta logou.
43. This lesson from Heidegger can, however, be embraced without sharing the immediate 
connection with teleology that Heidegger makes in his phenomenology of “as,” see Heidegger 
[1927] 1993, 148–149. Although for entirely different concerns than my present ones, Levinas 
already questioned the inevitability of this primary teleological stamp on one’s relation to 
things—see his phenomenology of dwelling and pleasure (jouissance) in Part 2 of Levinas 
[1961] 1998.
44. See Ricœur’s judicious qualification of this kind of undertaking: “I’m well aware that 
a reading of Being and Time in a purely anthropological sense runs the risk of completely 
missing the meaning of the entire work inasmuch as its ontological aim may be misconceived. 
Dasein is the ‘place’ where the being that we are is constituted through its capacity of posing 
the question of Being or the meaning of Being. To isolate the philosophical anthropology of 
Being and Time, therefore, is to overlook this major signification of the central existential 
category of the work. Yet in Being and Time, the question of Being is opened up precisely 
by an analysis that must first have some consistency as a philosophical anthropology, if it is 
to achieve the ontological breakthrough that is expected of it” Ricœur [1983] 1990b, 60–61.
45. For the sake of the coherence of the current argument, I need to briefly recall the most 
relevant parts of a hermeneutics of technical action developed elsewhere. However, it should 
be noted that in both these earlier texts, I still worked with a typology of technical action, 
which I have since abandoned. My first attempt (Wolff 2006) was based on an analogy 
with Ricœur’s general textual hermeneutics; in the second attempt, which I follow here, the 
hermeneutic spiral of Ricœur’s narrative theory served as analogy for the development of a 
hermeneutics of technical action (Wolff 2012).
46. I am fully aware of the different human-technology-world relations presented by Don 
Ihde, for example, in Ihde 1990, 72–115. Although Ihde uses a much narrower notion of 
“hermeneutics” in that he uses the term to refer to people’s use of text-like instruments, 
such as measuring devices, his work and the idea of multi-stability complement the ideas I 
present here. I intend to pursue this potentially fruitful complementarity in another study.
47. For the demonstration and detail on the two illustrations that follow see Wolff 2012, 
especially the conclusion.
48. Aristotle speaks, in the domain of virtue, of the fact that an agent may well consciously 
decide to acquire a certain virtuous disposition, and is in this sense responsible for the kind 
of ethical agent that he or she is. However, the small gradual additions to an already formed 
disposition happen without the agent’s knowledge (hekasta dé hé prosthésis ou gnorimos—
NE 1115a1). Although I am not fully convinced either of the masterly control that the agent 
initially has over the course of acquisition adopted, nor about the complete ignorance regard-
ing the small developments, Aristotle may well have put his finger on the manner in which 
medical interventions (prothesis in a very general sense) may add something to technical 
agency, although in a manner outside of the circuit of acquisition of skill through training.
49. See section IV.C above. It is here that the incorporation of Ihde’s human—technol-
ogy—world relations and his reflections on multi-stability would be very valuable.
50. An excellent discussion of the systemic nature of technics on a range of different scales 
of size is provided by Ropohl 1999.
51. The analysis of the associative aspect of agency is a particularly difficult task when work-
ing in the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition. Heidegger’s notion of co-existence 
(Mitsein) and the corresponding idea of a shared horizon of meaning through action (to which 
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the notion “Mitwelt,” co-world, refers) remain a quite underdeveloped part of his thought—
see Heidegger [1927] 1993, §§25–27. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercoproreity 
(intercorporéité) is not developed in detail for an action theory either (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 
282 and 1964, 183). In his last book, Ricœur 2004 clearly indicates the place of collective 
agency in his hermeneutics of the capable human (l’homme capable) and makes valuable 
suggestions to understanding its nature. However, even in this book, the issue of collective 
agency is not well integrated into the broader theory and remains in need of development, 
Ricœur 2004, 215–232. This is a theme that is in urgent need of elaboration elsewhere.
52. Supposing for the purposes of my argument that this is valid.
53. This is important, because, just as my initial re-reading of Aristotle is motivated by a 
specific moment in the reception of his work (namely the early Heidegger’s general herme-
neutics), so my redeployment of the normative moment of the Nicomachean Ethics stands in 
the sign of another moment of the reception of his work (in particular Ricœur’s “little ethics” 
in Oneself as another). My own Ricœurian redeployment of Aristotle is, as the reader will 
quickly notice, as critical of Ricœur’s own unfortunate negligence of the technical aspect 
of the capable human being (l’homme capable) as it is of Heidegger’s distorted view of 
technical action.
54. It is worth bearing in mind the external conditions (Aristotle, for instance, refers to 
friendship, material supplies and justice) as the “deontological” or context-independent 
moment in Aristotle’s ethics.
55. So as to avoid practising an ethic of principles (Gesinnungsethik) that remains foreign 
to the demands of reality. This problem was presented by Weber [1919] 1999, 435–450. See 
also Schluchter’s excellent commentary from 1971 and my developments on this theme in 
Wolff 2011, 175–266.
56. It would be possible to demonstrate that the justification and judgment of the technical 
aspect of action is subject to the same pluralism of values (or “common goods”) and thus 
of the orders of justification to which action in general is subject. Boltanski and Thévenot 
1991 have identified six such orders (inspiration [art and religion], family, public opinion, 
citizenship, the market and industry) which, in my view, each in its own way binds the hu-
man technical ability into a project and a frame of justification, evaluation, condemnation 
and compromise (depending on the case).
57. That these opposites can meet has been demonstrated convincingly in Horkheimer’s 
critique of instrumental reason, as seen in Rohbeck 1993, 122–141.
58. The thrust of my argument—in continuation with the discussion of Aristotle in section 
II of this study—is, however, to avoid entrusting the question regarding the competence 
that would enable one each time to find the mean between the two vices/flaws to an action 
typology dependent on techné and phronésis, since such an approach would not do justice 
to either of these aspects of agency.
59. See Ricœur 1990a, study 9, and my study on Ricœur and responsibility in Wolff 2011, 
chapter 9.
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